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ABBEVILLE COUNTYSCHOOL DISTRICT V. STATE:
THE RIGHT TO A MriMALLY ADEQUATE
EDUCATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent case Abbeville County School District v. State,' the South
Carolina Supreme Court addressed the requirements of article eleven, section
three of the South Carolina Constitution, which states in part that "[t]he
General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system
of free public schools open to all children in the State." 2 The court found this
section mandated a "minimally adequate" system ofpublic schools and detailed
certain characteristics of a minimally adequate school system? The dissent,
however, maintained that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the
judiciary from reviewing the adequacy of the purely legislative function of
implementing this clause.4
This Note reviews Abbeville by focusing on the judiciary's interpretation
of the South Carolina Constitution's education clause in relation to three waves
of education finance reform litigation. 5 Part II ofthis Note describes Abbeville,
the historical development of public education in South Carolina, and the three
waves of education finance reform litigation. Part III analyzes the approach of
other state courts in interpreting their own constitution's education clauses and
the position ofthese decisions in the "three waves." Finally, this Note suggests
the education clause of the South Carolina Constitution did provide a basis for
the court's holding in Abbeville without violating the separation of powers
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Abbeville County School District v. State

* This Note originally appeared in Book 2, Volume 51 of the SOUTH CAROUNA LAW
REVIEW.
1. 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999).
2. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
3. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 68, 515 S.E.2d at 540.
4. Id. at 70, 515 S.E.2d at 541 (Moore, J., dissenting).
5. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact ofthe Montana,Kentucky, andTexas
Decisionson theFutureofPublicSchoolFinanceReformLitigation,19 J.L. &EDUC. 219 (1990)
(describing three waves of education finance reform cases).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2000

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 7
SouTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51: 781

InAbbevile, forty impoverished public school districts and twenty of their
taxpayers sued the State of South Carolina in order to challenge South
Carolina's current scheme for funding public education. 6 In addition to
allegations that the state's education funding scheme violated the state and
federal constitution's equal protection clauses and the South Carolina
Education Finance Act (EFA), the school districts asserted the state had not
adequately funded education in their districts.7 The school districts claimed this
underfunding resulted in an inadequate education and thus violated the South
Carolina Constitution's education clause.8 The education clause states that
"[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
system of free public schools open to all children in the State and shall
establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning, as
may be desirable." 9
The circuit court dismissed the school district's claim, finding they did not
assert a cause ofaction.'0 Specifically, the trial court found the education clause
only requires the existence of a system of free public schools without
prescribing qualitative or adequacy standards." The trial court further stated the
separation of powers, judicial restraint, and political question doctrines2
precluded judicial intervention in an area where the legislature is supreme .
The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. 3
First, the supreme court quickly dismissed both the equal protection claims
and the EFA claim.' 4 The supreme court then, basing the remainder of its
opinion on the South Carolina Constitution's education clause, held "the South
Carolina Constitution's education clause requires the General Assembly to
provide the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally adequate
education."'" Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Finney cited a supporting
phrase in the South Carolina Education Finance Act in which the General
Assembly stated the purpose of the EFA was to give public school students "'at
least minimum educational programs and services. ..."
The majority, relying on similar decisions in Kentucky, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, West Virginia, and other states, went on to define the
constitutional requirements of a "minimally adequate education" as the
existence of satisfactory and secure buildings where students can acquire:

6. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 63, 515 S.E.2d at 538.
7. Id. at 63-64, 515 S.E.2d at 538.
8. Id.
9. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
10. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 63, 515 S.E.2d at 538.
11. Id. at 66-67, 515 S.E.2d at 539.
12. Id. at 67, 515 S.E.2d at 539.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 64-65, 515 S.E.2d at 538-39.
15. Id. at 68, 515 S.E.2d at 540.
16. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-20-30 (Law. Co-op. 1990)).
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1) the ability to read, write, and speak the English language,
and knowledge of mathematics and physical science;
2) a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems, and of history and governmental processes;
and
3) academic and vocational skills. 7
In conclusion, the court stated the legislature has the duty of providing public
education that meets these constitutional standards. 8 The court maintained no
intention to assume legislative authority with its ruling but did find the
complaint stated a cause of action.' 9 Accordingly, the court remanded the case
for a further determination of whether the South Carolina education finance
system actually violated this constitutional mandate."
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Moore stated the South Carolina
Constitution gives the state legislature alone the right to determine the
standards of public education."1 Arguing that the education clause contains no
qualitative standard, he maintained that the judiciary cannot restrict the
legislature's control over education when there is no restrictive text in the
constitution.' Justice Moore concluded his dissent by stating the legislature,
through the EFA, the Education Improvement Act, and the Education
Accountability Act, had already taken measures to ensure the children
attending South Carolina public schools receive an adequate education.'
Abbeville did not raise an issue of first impression for the South Carolina
Supreme Court. The court had considered the requirements of the South
Carolina Constitution's education clause in two previous cases. In Washington
v. Salisbury,24 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether a tuition

charge for a public summer school class violated section three of the education
clause.' The court held summer school is not a part of the constitution's grant
of a free public school system, thereby rendering the charge allowable.26 More
importantly, the court found the constitution unambiguously states that the

17. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court derived these criteria from cases heard by courts
in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the court cited Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretaryofthe Executive Office ofEducation, 615 N.E.2d
516 (Mass. 1993); Leandrov. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); and Randolph County Board
of Education v. Adams, 467 S.E.2d 150 (W.Va. 1995). Id. The criteria stated by the court in
Abbeville most closely resemble those cited in Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
18. Abbeville, 335 S.C. at 69, 515 S.E.2d at 541.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 70, 515 S.E.2d at 541 (Moore, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 71,515 S.E.2d at 542 (Moore, J., dissenting).
24. 279 S.C. 306, 306 S.E.2d 600 (1983).
25. Id. at 307, 306 S.E.2d at 600.
26. Id. at 308, 306 S.E.2d at 601.
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General2Assembly
is solely responsible for providing a free system of public
7
schools.
RichlandCounty v. Campbell" addressed a challenge that the system for
financing public education was unconstitutional under the education clause of
the South Carolina Constitution.29 In this case, the court stated that the General
Assembly's powers overpublic education are virtually unlimited and the details
of providing the free public school system are left by the constitution to the
legislature's best judgment. 0 Each of the preceding cases was the result of a
complicated series of events that formed public education in South Carolina.
B. HistoricalDevelopment ofPublic Education in South Carolina
Public education in South Carolina began partially because of the efforts
of the Anglican Church.3" As the Society for Propagating the Gospel in Foreign
Parts sent teachers and ministers from England to the new colonies, private
citizens began contributing money for education. 32 A statute was enacted in
1710 creating an education commission with the power to administer these
donations.33 The regime envisioned by this law, however, was never achieved
because the governor, the only person with authority to call an education
commission meeting, passed away immediately after the law was enacted. 3'
Two 1712 acts eventually replaced the 1710 legislation. 35 The first gave
funds to a teacher sent to South Carolina by the Society for Propagating the
Gospel in Foreign Parts.36 The act also appointed an individual to be the
Charleston37schoolmaster with removal power vested only in the General
Assembly.
The second 1712 act created a free school in Charleston. 3' A commission
and schoolmaster were appointed to supervise the school, and an annual
appropriation was made to pay the schoolmaster's wages. 39 The free school,
however, was not a typical public school; the education commissioners could
only give a free education to twelve students per yearf' Although everyone else

27. Id.
28. 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988).
29. Id. at 348, 364 S.E.2d at471.
30. Id. at 349, 364 S.E.2d at 472 (citing Hildebrand v. High School District No. 32, 138
S.C. 445, 136 S.E. 757 (1927)).
31. 2 JAmXES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CoNsTITUrIoN OF SourH CAROLINA 28 (1989).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at29.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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had to pay, this free school was still a significant step toward modem public
schools because it was publicly supported and regulated.4"
The Revolutionary War and statehood, along with the decline of the
Anglican Church, led to changes in the allotment of educational funds. 42 A law
enacted by the legislature in 1811 provided that 'every citizen of the state
[was] entitled to send his or her child or children, ward or wards, into any free
school in the district where he or she may reside free from any expense
whatsoever on account of tuition. . . ,,,4'
The law further stated, when the
number ofapplicants exceeded capacity, poor children were given priority over
those with the ability to fund their own education.' Thus, this law approached
a more modem public school philosophy.45
The 1811 law also mandated that the number of a district's public schools
equal the number of the district's representatives in the legislature." However,
this method of allocation was a very inexact indicator of a district's need for
public schools because representation in the state legislature was based equally
on the number ofwhite residents and the sum of taxable property in a district.47
Moreover, all schools received an equal amount of funding ($300 per year)
notwithstanding the number of students or financial need.' Finally, the 1811
law allowed the General Assembly to retain control over the schools by
selecting certain individuals to sit on the board of commissioners for each
district and by dictating a basic curriculum.49
In 1835, the General Assembly created a new method of addressing the
needs of individual school districts.50 Districts were divided into subdivisions,
and one of the district commissioners oversaw each subdivision."
Nevertheless, this system still had a major flaw: local citizens could influence
educational decisions only through their legislators.52
Realizing South Carolina's educational system needed better local control
and more citizen involvement, Stephen Elliot, Jr. and J.H. Thomwell,
professors at South Carolina College, made a futile attempt atreformbeginning
in 1839.' Their suggestions included the following: centralizing control in a
State Superintendent of Education, apportioning educational resources on the

41. Id.
42. Id. at 30.

43.
1839)).
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 31 (citing ActNo. 1980 of 1811, § HI, 5 S.C. STATUTES ATLARGE 639 (McCord
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.

48. Id.

49. Id. Local commissioners could add to the state mandated curriculum. Id.
50. Id. at 31 (citing Act of 1835, No. 1980, § VI, 6 S.C. STATUTEs AT LARGE 529-30

(McCord 1839)).
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.
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basis of the number of children in the district who needed an education,
spending funds granted to each school district according to the Secretary of
Education's and local educational board's policies, developing a teacher
training school, incorporating the Bible into studies, and increasing educational
spending.54 Because none of these suggestions were adopted immediately,
Charleston created its own public schools after studying successful school
systems in other states."5 However, the beginning of the Civil War shifted
attention away from education reform.56
The Constitutional Convention of 1868 adopted South Carolina's first
constitutional education article. Article ten of the 1868 South Carolina
Constitution provides for a State Superintendent of Education, a State Board
of Education, compulsory attendance for all students between six and sixteen
years of age, and schools for the deafandblind.57 Section three of the education
article stated:
The General Assembly shall ...provide for a liberal and
uniform system of free public schools throughout the State,
and shall also make provision for the division of the State into
suitable school districts. There shall be kept open at least six
months in each year one or more schools in each school
district.58
This section was passed without amendment or debate in the same form as that
originally proposed by the education committee at the 1868 Constitutional
Convention.59
The compulsory attendance requirement did trigger legislative debate.6"
Whether arguing for or against compulsory attendance, the statements of
several delegates revealed the importance of the educational system created in
section three of the 1868 constitution. Mr. A.J. Ransier stated that civilization
progresses "in proportion to the education of the people."' 6' Further, Mr. R.B.
Elliott declared:
If [students] are compelled to be educated, there will be no
danger of the Union, or a second secession of South Carolina
from the Union. The masses will be intelligent, and will
become the great strength and bulwark of republicanism. If

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

(1868).

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, §§ 1-2, 4, 7.
S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3.
2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, at 655

60. See id. at 685-709.
61. Id. at 688.
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they remain uneducated, they will inevitably remain ignorant,
and it is a well known fact, that ignorance is the parent ofvice
and crime, and was the sustainer of the late gigantic
slaveholder's rebellion.62
Finally, in defense of compulsory education, Mr. B.F. Whittemore argued, "let
us provide for the diffusion of intelligence, and we keep out of the jails and
penitentiaries a large number of people."'63
South Carolina's Constitution and its education article were revised in
1895. Article eleven, the education article ofthe 1895 Constitution, retained the
State Superintendent of Education and the State Board of Education."
However, compulsory attendance was not included. 6 Article eleven also added
an entirely new provision in section seven that provided "[s]eparate schools
shall be provided for children of the white and colored races."66 Furthermore,
the wording of the clause giving the General Assembly authority to establish
the public school system was changed to state:
The General Assembly shall provide for a liberal system of
free public schools for all children between the ages of six
and twenty-one years, and for the division of the Counties
into suitable school districts, as compact in form as
practicable, having regard to natural boundaries, and not to
exceed forty-nine nor be less than nine square miles in
67
area ....
No debate regarding the adoption of this section was recorded in the official
record of the 1895 Constitutional Convention." Only the Chief Executive's
comments regarding education at the beginning of the convention were put on
paper. He observed, "[it is a principle of government that the best educated
people are the happiest and easiest governed."69'
The General Assembly approved the Committee to Make a Study of the
South Carolina Constitution of 1895 (the West Committee) by a concurrent
resolution passed on April 7, 1966.70 After three years of work, the West
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 700.
S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XI § 1-2.
See S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XI.
S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XI, § 7.
S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XI, § 5.
68. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

OF 1895, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, at 554-555 (1895).

69. Id. at 12.
70. COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE S.C. CONSTITUTION OF 1895, FINAL REPORT OF
THE COMM. TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE S.C. CONSTITUTION OF 1895, at Transmittal Letter(1969).
The West Committee took its name from its chairman, then Senator John C. West, who was
governor of South Carolina from 1969 to 1971.
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Committee recommended various changes to the 1895 South Carolina
Constitution,7 including changes to the education article.
The West Committee recommended the education article be reduced to
four sections instead of the twelve sections listed in the 1895 constitution. 73 The
first two sections created a State Board of Education and a Superintendent of
Education similar to the ones created in 1895.74 The third section recommended
a free public school system with a new provision stating that "[t]he General
Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
public schools open to all children in the State and shall establish, organize, and
support such other public institutions of learning, as may be desirable."75 The
West Committee's final report explicitly states, "[t]he phrase 'free public
school system' permits the General Assembly to define the concept by law,"
a statement which infers public education is the sole responsibility of the
legislature. 76 The fourth section proscribed public funds for religious and
private educational institutions. 7
The committee's working papers give further insight into why the third
section was structured as it was in the committee's proposal. Section five of the
1895 constitution, which required public schools be free to all students, had
been eliminated even before the committee began its revision efforts because
South Carolina citizens questioned the provision of a system of free public
education." Referring to the constitutions of other states, the committee found
that "[a]hnost all constitutions do give the General Assembly a mandate on
public education and almost all require such schools be free. 79 In
recommending a section that again required a free public school system, the
committee thus stated that the proposed provisions succinctly and adequately
provided for both public and higher educational systems.8"
The committee also recommended the deletion of various sections of the
education article of the 1895 constitution.' Most importantly, the committee
recommended removing the provision of the 1895 constitution that provided
for separate schools for whites and blacks.8" The committee stated the United
States Supreme Court decisions had, in effect, made this provision

71. Id.
72. Seeid. at 98-103.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 98.
76. Id. at 99.
77. Id. at 98.
78. Working Paper #4, in 4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMM. To MAKE A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1895), at 10 (on file with the University of South Carolina
Law Library).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 11.
81. See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM. TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
CONSTITUTION OF 1895, at 101-03.

82. Id. at 103.
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unconstitutional.8 3 Therefore, it could not be enforced and should not be
included.84 As education clauses such as this one became much more common,
litigation based on these clauses began to arise.
C. The Three Waves ofSchool FinanceReform Litigation
The financing of public education, guaranteed by almost all state
constitutions, has been the subject of many courtroom battles. Commentators,
beginning with William E. Thro, have generally divided school finance
litigation into three waves. 85 During the first wave, lasting approximately from
1971 to 1973, school finance reform litigation was based on the United States
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 86 Plaintiffs initially contended the
Equal Protection Clause gives each school district within a state the right to
equal funds8 Mter this theory was rejected by two federal courts, plaintiffs
introduced a new "fiscal neutrality" theory based on the Equal Protection
Clause.88 This theory maintained that "state financing schemes that allowed the
quality of a child's education to vary with the wealth of his or her parents
denied that child equal protection."8 9 This first wave of school finance litigation
began with the California Supreme Court's acceptance of the fiscal neutrality
theory in Serranov. Priest,90but ended shortly thereafter with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio School Districtv. Rodriguez.9'
The second wave of school finance litigation, lasting approximately from
1973 to 1989, began just thirteen days after Rodriguez with the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Cahill and focused on two distinct
clauses in state constitutions.93 This wave of litigation focused on education
clauses, contained in all state constitutions except Mississippi's.94 The second
wave also focused on state constitution's equal protection clauses or their
functional equivalent.95 Plaintiffs urged state courts to find that "education was
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisionson the FutureofPublicSchool FinanceReform Litigation,19 J.L. &EDUC. 219

(1990).
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 222-23.
Id. at223.
Id.

William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisionsin PublicSchool FinanceReform Litigation,75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1650 (1989).
90. 487 P.2d 1241, 1249-51 (Cal. 1971) (holding California's educational finance system
violative ofboth the federal and state equal protection clauses because educational quality was
directly related to the wealth of the child's parents).
91. 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (holding that school finance reform at issue did not violate the
federal Equal Protection Clause.
92. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson 1).
93. Thro, supranote 85, at 228.
94. Id. at 229.
95. Id. at 229-3 0.
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a fundamental right, that wealth was a suspect class, or that the finance system
was irrational. 9 6 Even in this wave, plaintiffs' victories occurred much less
frequently than their defeats.97
In the third wave of school finance reform litigation, which still continues
today, state court holdings rely exclusively on the education clauses in state
constitutions.9" This allows courts to apply their decisions only to education
litigation.' Courts may be more receptive to this sort of decisionmaking
because a decision based on an education clause does not affect other areas of
the law as much as a decision based on an equal protection clause.' 00 With the
exclusive focus on the education clauses of state constitutions,1 1the differences
between the education clauses have become more important.
Education clauses can be divided into four categories.102Category I clauses
contain the fewest educational requirements. 3 These clauses "provide for a
system of free public schools and nothing more."'' t 4 In contrast, Category II
education clauses impose a minimum qualitative standard on public schools.'
For example, the Kentucky Constitution's requirement of an "efficient system
of common schools" is a minimum qualitative standard.'0 6 Category III
education clauses contain a specific education requirement and a preamble
which states their purpose.'0 7 The California Constitution, a perfect example of
a Category III clause, provides, "[a] general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement."'0' Category IV

96. Id. at 230 (footnotes omitted).
97. Id. at 232.
98. Id. at239.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 241.
101. Id. at 243. Some have claimed the third wave has collapsed because courts have
questioned their legitimacy, which includes separation of powers, political question, and
federalism concerns, and their competency, which includes their ability to understand the
problem and develop a solution in an area where the courts are not experts. See Kevin Randall
McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The EmergingFourth Wave of School FinanceReform
Litigationandthe Courts'LingeringInstitutional
Concerns,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867,1890(1998).
A fourth wave of school finance reform litigation may come into existence "characterized by the
inclusion of the racial and ethnic divide in plaintiff's claims or the use of two distinct state
constitutional provisions that coalesce to create a more viable cause ofaction for the plaintiffs."
Id. at 1900 (citing Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996)).
102. Thro, supra note 89, at 1661.
103. Id. at 1661.
104. Id. at 1662.
105. Id. at 1663.
106. Id. (citing KY. CONST. § 183).
107. Thro, supra note 85, at 244-45.
108. Id. at 245 n.138 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1).
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clauses contain the greatest requirements and generally describe state education
as "'fundamental,' 'primary,'or 'paramount. '" 0 9
William E. Thro maintains Category I education clauses provide no basis
for school finance reform because the legislature's duty is only to create a
system of public schools. " ' Still, Thro notes that the Connecticut Supreme
Court, in interpreting the Category I education clause in its own constitution,
found school finance reform necessary."' However, Thro contends the court's
holding was based on the equality guaranty clause in the constitution." 2 In
contrast, Thro states Category IV clauses provide a proper basis for mandating
school finance reform because "[t]he provision imposes a continuing
multifaceted obligation on the legislature, and school finance reform obviously
is one aspect of that duty."" 3
Additionally, Thro contends that third wave cases shouldbe analyzed using
a five-question model.' First, the court must determine if the case before it is
an equality suit or a quality suit.' Second, if the court is hearing a quality suit,
the court must determine if the state's education clause contains a qualitative
standard, by looking at the four categories of education clauses." 6 If the clause
contains a qualitative standard, the court must then define this standard. '7 Next,
the court must determine if the school districts involved in the suit meet this
standard." 8 Finally, if the court finds the entire educational system does not
meet the constitutional standard, the court must determine the role of funding
in improving the system so that it meets the constitutional mandate." 9
These three waves indicate that much history preceded the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Abbeville. When Abbeville was decided, most
other state courts were focusing on the education clause alone in making a
determination in education finance reform litigation. Thus, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Abbeville seems to fit into the third wave of
education finance reform litigation.
III. ANALYSIS
Because providing public education is an important state function, almost
all state constitutions include sections that address the requirements of a public

109. Thro, supranote 89, at 1667-68.
110. Thro, supranote 85, at 246.
111. Id. at 248 n.162 (citing Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (1977)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 246.
114. William E. Thro, JudicialAnalysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The MassachusettsDecision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597,605 (1994).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 607.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 607-08.
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educational system. The prevalence of these education clauses means that
Abbeville is hardly a case of first impression in the United States. However,
San Antonio Independent School Distict v. Rodriguez'2 ° seems to end any
participation by the federal courts in determining substantive educational rights
under the United States Constitution.' As a result of the lack of federal
participation, many states have dealt with the same issue raised in Abbeville,
namely whether a clause guaranteeing a free public school system requires a
minimally adequate education. The courts of Connecticut, New Jersey, West
Virginia, Texas, and Kentucky have all had occasion to interpret their own
constitution's education clauses. Their holdings may provide insight into the
nuances of education finance reform litigation and why the South Carolina
Supreme Court held as it did in Abbeville.
A. InterpretationofEducation Clauses in OtherJurisdictions
1. Connecticut
Article eight, section one of the Connecticut Constitution, which is very
similar to the South Carolina Constitution's education clause, states "[t]here
shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The
general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation."' "
The meaning of this provision
was addressed by the Connecticut Supreme
3
Court in Horton v. Meskill.'2
In Horton, the plaintiffs claimed that Connecticut's system of financing
public education violated the state and federal equal protection clauses as well
as the state constitution's education clause. 2 The court in Horton held that
education is a fundamental right in Connecticut.12- The court found that
Connecticut's system of public educational funding was based primarily on
local property tax levies that did not take into account differences in wealth
between districts. Moreover, the system lacked any additional state funds for
property-poor districts. 26 The court held that this method of educational
funding violated the education clause because it did not provide similar
opportunities to all students attending public schools in Connecticut. 27

120. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
121. See Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State

Constitutions, 1997 BYU. EDUC. &L.J. 1, 10 (1997).
122. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.

123. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
124. Id. at 361.
125. Id. at 373.

126. Id.
127. Id. at 374.
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The court, following the early separation of powers tendency to leave the
solution to the legislature,'28 left any remedy to the legislature's discretion. 9
The court stated that "the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing
elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper function
of the legislative department but its expressly mandated duty under the
provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1.' ' 130 Providing
guidance to the legislature, the court further stated that strict equity was not
constitutionally mandated.13 1 Thus, in fashioning its remedy, the legislature was
32
able to consider the unique needs and interests of the various school districts.1
Horton was decided during the second wave of education finance reform
litigation. The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision typified the main
characteristic of these second wave cases by utilizing both the state
constitution's equal protection clause and its education clause to invalidate the
education financing system. The court did not have to utilize both of these
clauses in its decision. It could have ended its analysis after finding education
was a fundamental right because this finding was enough to hold the financing
system inadequate under the constitution's equality guarantee. 33Nevertheless,
the court also found the constitution's education clause useful. The Connecticut
Supreme Court stated that "in the light of the Connecticut constitutional
recognition of the right to education (article eighth, § 1) it is, in Connecticut a
'fundamental' right."' 34 This statement indicates that the Connecticut Supreme
Court relied on both clauses in holding the education financing system
inadequate.
Under Thro's analysis, Connecticut's education clause alone may not have
been enough to invalidate the school financing system. Although categorical
analysis of the education clauses is generally confined to third wave cases,
Connecticut's education clause, which simply requires a free public school
system, must be a Category I clause.131 Thro contends:
To somehow hold that a Category I clause calling for a
system of free public schools of unspecified quality is the
basis for reform would be ridiculous. According to the very

128. See Michael A.Rebell &Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy andEngagement:The Remedies
Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill- and a ProposedSolution, 29 CoNN. L. Rv. 1115, 1139
(1997).
129. Horton, 376 A.2d at 375.
130. Id. The same plaintiffs returned to court eight years later to challenge the new
education financing scheme as unconstitutional. The Connecticut Supreme Court found the
system constitutional but harmed by legislative inaction in fully implementing it. See Horton v.
Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985).
131. Horton, 376 A.2d at 376.
132. Id.
133. Thro, supra note 85, at 230.
134. Horton, 376 A.2d at 373.
135. Thro, supra note 85, at 243 n.131.
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terms of the provision, the legislature has met its obligation
simply by setting up a free public school system. 3 6
If Thro's contention is accurate, the ruling of the Connecticut Supreme Court
that the school finance system must be reformed had to be based, at least in
part, on the equality guarantee. The education clause does not otherwise
provide a valid basis for mandating reform. Furthermore, the Horton opinion
seemingly did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The Horton court
simply found the present system inadequate; it did not define adequacy or
command the legislature to enact a certain system to correct the inadequacy. 37
2. New Jersey
Article eight, section four, paragraph one of the New Jersey Constitution
states that "[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of
a thorough andefficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years."' 38 The New
Jersey Supreme Court has addressed the "thorough and efficient"
provision in
40
39
two series of cases: Robinson v. Cahill' and Abbott v. Burke.
a. Robinson v. Cahill
The New Jersey Supreme Court examined the thorough and efficient
clause over a series of seven cases beginning in 1973 with the first decision in
Robinson v. Cahill'4 1 (Robinson 1). In Robinson 1,the New Jersey Supreme
Court first ruled that the state constitution's equal protection clause did not
provide a remedy to the problems existing in public education. 42 The court
next turned to the qualitative "thorough and efficient" text to invalidate the
current school financing scheme.'4 3 The court found that the substantial
differences in per pupil expenditures in property-rich and property-poor
districts justified its holding. 44 The Robinson I opinion then stated that the
constitutional requirement of a thorough and efficient public school education

136. Id. at 246.
137. See Horton, 376 A.2d at 374.
138. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1 (emphasis added). The qualitative "thorough and
efficient" language of this clause, while important to New Jersey case holdings, is absent from
the South Carolina Constitution.
139. Robinson v. Cahill (VII), 360 A.2d400 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill (V), 358 A.2d
457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill (P), 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill (IP), 351
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1974); Robinson v. Cahill (II),335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill (II),
306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill (1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
140. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (1985).
141. Robinson (1), 303 A.2d at 273.
142. Id. at 287.
143. Id. at 297.
144. Id.
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could only mean that all school districts must provide "an equal educational
opportunity."' 45 The court further defined the constitution's "thorough and
efficient" mandate as "embrac[ing] that educational opportunity which is
needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and
as a competitor in the labor market."'4"
New Jersey revisited the State's educational clause inRobinson V' 47 In that
case, the court concluded that the Public School Education Act, enacted as a
result of rulings of the New Jersey Supreme Court in previous Robinson cases,
was "in all respects constitutional on its face, again assuming it is fully
funded."' 46 However, the legislature failed to fund the act.' 49Thus, in Robinson
V,the court forbade any public official from distributing any educational funds
beginning July 1, 1976."50 In so acting, the New Jersey Supreme Court
"abruptly abandoned its deferential attitude and placed 'the school crisis
squarely in the lap of the Legislature.""' The Robinson VI court finally ended
its strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine and, in the process,
showed that courts will fulfill a constitutional mandate if the legislature fails to
take action.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's rulings in the Robinson series of cases
began the second wave of school finance reform litigation." 2 The Robinson
cases utilized both the New Jersey Constitution's education clause and its equal
protection guarantee in their holdings, although the final decision to modify the
current school financing system rested on the education clause alone. In
particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court seized on the "thorough and
efficient" clause as the basis for its holding that the New Jersey constitution's
education clause requires an education that gives children sufficient preparation
for their roles in society and the workforce. s3 A thorough and efficient public
school system implicitly provides students with the skills to adapt to the
demands of popular culture and family life.
The Robinson cases demonstrate the extent the judiciary will go to define
a constitutional mandate without usurping legislative powers. By acting after
prolonged legislative inaction, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggestion that
the separation of powers doctrine is not violated by a court taking an active role
in education finance reform.
145. Id. at 294.
146. Id. at 295.
147. 355 A.2d at 129.
148. Id. at 139.
149. Robinson v. Cahill(T9, 358 A.2d at 459.
150. Id. at 459.
151. Joshua S. Lichtenstein, Abbot v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's Commitment to
EducationalOpportunity,29 Hofstra L. Rev. 429,447 (1991) (quoting MartinWaldron, Schools
in JerseyFace July Closing,N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1976, at A23). The legislature still did not
comply with the new deadline. Id. On July 7, 1975, however, it enacted the state's first income
tax in order to comply with the court's ruling. Id.
152. Thro, supra note 85, at 228.
153. Robinson (1),
303 A.2d at 294-95.
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b. Abbott v. Burke
In the Abbott v. Burke series of cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
the Public School Education Act of 1975 unconstitutional as applied to poorer
school districts. 54 InAbbottl, school children fromNew Jersey's poorer school
districts brought a challenge to the constitutionality of the Act before the state
supreme court. 155 The court initially ruled that the plaintiffs' case should be
considered by a state administrative agency; the court specifically found that
an administrative law judge should hear the case because the State
Commissioner of Education was a named defendant. 56 After review by the
Education, the case
State's Commissioner of Education and the Board of
57
ultimately returned to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The New Jersey court inAbbottlfound the 1975 Education Act's goal of
equalizing per student expenditures in property-poor districts had never been
met. 58 In fact, the court stated that the 1975 educational funding scheme had
caused an increase in the gap between per pupil expenditures in more- and lessadvantaged districts.'59 Educational quality was also vastly lower in the poorer
districts. For example, foreign language programs, music programs, and
computer exposure were greatly superior in the richer districts. 60
The court found that the existing educational system in the poorer school
districts did not meet the requirements of the "thorough and efficient" clause
of the New Jersey Constitution.' 6' After quoting the RobinsonIdefinition of the
"thorough and efficient" clause, the court stated "that poorer disadvantaged
students must be given a chance to be able to compete with relatively
advantaged students."' 62 Because of the disparity in quality and the furtherance
of meaningful competition between disadvantaged and advantaged students, the
court found that "in poorer urban districts something more must be added to the
regular education in order to achieve the command of the Constitution."'63 The
court therefore ordered that per pupil expenditures in poorer districts be made
equal to those in the more advantaged districts and that they be great enough
to address unique problems faced by these disadvantaged school districts.'
The Abbott H ruling had two important effects. First, courts could feel
more comfortable in distancing themselves from the separation of powers

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Abbott v. Burke (I), 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
Abbott v. Burke (1), 495 A.2d 376, 379 (N.J. 1990).
Id. at 393.
Abbott (HI), 575 A.2d at 364-65.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at408.

162. Id. at 372.

163. Id. at 403.
164. Id. at 408.
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doctrine in order to declare an educational funding scheme unconstitutional. 65
Second, the decision decreased the plaintiff's burden of proof.166 Plaintiffs
could focus on the inadequacy of educational opportunities in the less
advantaged districts as opposed to proving funding disparities over the entire
state. 67 Moreover, the Abbott Hruling had important practical effects for less
privileged districts. Without violating separation ofpowers principles, the New
Jersey Supreme Court provided poorer, less advantaged districts with funds
large enough so that6 per pupil expenditures would be effectively equal
throughout the state. 1
The Abbott series of cases are a part of the third wave of education finance
reform litigation. 169 The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Abbott
exemplified the defining characteristic of third wave litigation-an exclusive
focus on the education clause of a state constitution in order to mandate
substantially equal per pupil expenditures in wealthier and poorer districts.
Moreover, because the New Jersey Constitution contains a "thorough and
efficient" qualitative standard, it seems to fall within the Category II education
clauses. 7 °
The Abbott court fulfilled its duty to interpret this clause by determining
whether the current financing system prohibited attainment of the qualitative
standard imposed by the clause.17 ' In finding thatperpupil expenditures needed
to be equalized, the court rightly determined that the current school financing
system did not meet the clause's qualitative standard. Furthermore, by ordering
equal per pupil expenditures, the court implicitly finished the five-question
analysis proposed by Thro for third wave education finance reform. 72
3.

West Virginia

Article twelve, section one of the West Virginia Constitution states that
"[t]he legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient
system of free schools.' ' 73 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
interpreted this "thorough and efficient" clause in the 1979 case Pauley v.
74
Kelly.
InPauley,the parents of five public school children filed a lawsuit against
various state officials claiming the public school financing system violated both
the "thorough and efficient" clause and the equal protection clause ofthe West

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See Lichtenstein, supra note 151, at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490.
See McMillan, supra note 101, at 1877.
See Thro, supra note 85, at 244, n.134.
Id. at 246-47.
See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.

173. W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § I (emphasis added).

174. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
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Virginia Constitution.'7 1 In defining a thorough and efficient education, the
court looked to constitutional debates as well as to thorough and efficient cases
in other states. 176 The court studied the words "thorough," "efficient," and
"education" as they were defined in dictionaries when the constitution was
written and also looked at how other states defined these terms.'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals then defined a thorough and
efficient education as "develop[ing], as best the state of education expertise
allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for
useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so
economically.' 7' The court then described characteristics that such an
educational system should impart to its students, including: the ability to read
and perform mathematical equations, the potential to understand government
functions so that informed votes can be made, the opportunity to gain enough
self-awareness in order to intelligently determine career alternatives, provision
of training for future careers, the promotion of cultural interests, and the
development of social etiquette to facilitate working with others. 79
The court utilized two clauses of the West Virginia Constitution to
conclude:
[Bloth our equal protection and thorough and efficient
constitutional principles can be applied harmoniously to the
State school financing system. Certainly, the mandatory
requirement of "a thorough and efficient system of free
schools," found in Article XII, Section 1 of our Constitution,
demonstrates that education is a fundamental constitutional
right in this State.' 0
The court then remanded the case to determine, in part, if the West Virginia
system of public schools met the above characteristics.'8 '
Pauley is a typical decision in the second wave of education finance reform
litigation. Because the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals relied on both
the equal protection guaranty and the education clause to determine the present
school financing scheme was unconstitutional, the decision exemplified the

175. Id. at861.
176. See id. at 866-67.
177. See id. at 874-77. The court never expressly defined "thorough" or "efficient." The
court simply said a thorough and efficient education usually adapts to meet the needs of
beneficiaries. Id. at 876. The court did define education as "the development of mind, body and
social morality (ethics) to prepare persons for useful and happy occupations, recreation and
citizenship." Id. at 877.
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 878.
181. Id.
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second wave's defining characteristic ofutilizing both equality guarantees and
education clauses to make a decision.
The Pauley definition of a thorough and efficient education was approved
in a later West Virginia case, Randolph County Board of Education v.
Adams.'82 Adams was a declaratory judgment action filed by the Randolph
County Board of Education after it lost a levy to establish a book user fee for
non-needy children.'83 The court quoted the Pauleydefinition of a thorough and
efficient education and the factors that characterized such a system.184 The court
then found, because the goal of public schools is to encourage students to reach
their potential academically and socially, "whatever items are deemed
necessaryto accomplish the goals of a school system... must be provided free
of charge to all students in order to comply with the constitutional mandate of
a 'free school' system."' 85 The court held textbooks are a necessary part of the
public school system and must therefore be provided at no charge to students.186
The West Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeal's decision inAdams typified
cases in the third wave of education finance reform litigation. The court
focused on the education clause alone in holding textbooks are a necessary part
of public education and seized on the definition of "thorough and efficient" to
provide support for its holding.'87 Because the West Virginia Constitution
contains this minimum qualitative standard, it falls within the Category II
education clauses. Therefore, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had
a basis, in the words "thorough and efficient" for its interpretation of the state
constitution's education clause.
The Adams court also indicated its decision was not intended to interfere
with the separation of powers doctrine.'88 The role of the judiciary is to
effectuate the intent of the framers of the constitution. The court found that this
role included determining the legitimacy of the West Virginia public school
education financing system."89
4. Texas
The Texas Constitution, in language that strongly contrasts that used in the
South Carolina Constitution, states in article seven, section one that "[a]
general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the
liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the
State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

467 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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of an efficient system of public free schools.""'9 This constitutional provision
has been at issue in three Texas cases involving the Edgewood Independent
School District.
In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby91 (Edgewood 1), the
Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas public school financing system
violated the education clause of the Texas Constitution.'" The plaintiffs
presented proof that the system of funding public schools, based largely on
local property taxes, led to gross disparities in per pupil expenditures and
substantial differences inthe quality of educational programs.'93 The court held
the constitutional mandate of "efficiency" did not allow a system with such
extreme gaps in quality and expenditures between the richer and poorer
districts. 194 The purpose of the efficiency clause was to establish an educational
system that gave rise to "the general diffusion of knowledge."'9 5 The court
found "[t]he present system, by contrast, provides not for a diffusion that is
general, but for one that is limited and unbalanced."' 96 The system therefore did
not meet the constitutional requirement of efficiency.'97 The Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Edgewoodlindicated that the students attending the poorer
school districts were receiving an inadequate education. The goal of the court's
decision seemed to be increasing per pupil expenditures in the poorer districts
so that these districts could provide the educational programs and instruction
necessary to meet Texas's minimum educational standards.'98 Because school
districts could still provide additional funding through property tax levies, the
obvious goal of the decision was not to provide equal funding to school
districts, but simply to provide adequate funding."'
00
In the 1991 case Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
(Edgewood I1), the identical plaintiffs returned to court alleging that the
legislative response to Edgewoodlwasinadequate. 20 ' Texas Senate Bill 1 had
attempted to provide equal revenue to school districts through biennial
adjustments. 0 2 However, the Texas Supreme Court found the bill retained the
same financing scheme as used previously and therefore caused the same

190. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added).
191. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
192. Id. at 397.
193. Id. at 392-93.
194. Id. at 396.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Richard J. Stark, Educational Reform: Judicial Interpretation of State
Constitutions' EducationFinanceProvisions-Adequacyvs. Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
609,641 (1991).
199. Id. at 642.
200. 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
20 1. Id. at 493.
202. Id. at 495.
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problems. 3 As a result, the court found the Texas school financing system was
still lacking in efficiency and extended the injunction so the legislature could
again attempt to fix the problem. In this decision, the Texas court fulfilled its
duty to interpret the constitution while still observing the separation of powers
doctrine.
In EdgewoodIndependentSchool Districtv. Meno 2°4 (EdgewoodIII), the
Texas Supreme Court ratified the legislature's latest efforts to meet the
requirements of the Texas Constitution's education clause.2" 5 Edgewood I
confirmed the court's position that "[d]istricts must have substantially equal
access to funding up to the legislatively defined level that achieves the
constitutional mandate of a general diffusion of knowledge."'36 Furthermore,
districts could add to state funding locally through property tax levies so long
as efficiency was not destroyed.2 7
The Edgewood cases typify the third wave of education finance reform
litigation because the court focused solely on the education clause of the Texas
Constitution to make its decision. The Texas Supreme Court did not even
address the plaintiffs' state equal protection claim, indicating the education
clause alone was enough to invalidate the present system for financing public
education. The court's interpretation of its education clause seems proper.
Because the Texas Constitution requires its educational system to be efficient,
it imposes a minimum qualitative standard and thus seems to fit within the
Category II fiamework.20 8 In interpreting its constitution's Category II
education clause, the court inquired as to whether the present financing system
prohibits the achievement of the qualitative standard of efficiency.20 9 The court,
implicitly if not explicitly using Thro's five-question analysis for third wave
cases, found that it did.
The Edgewood cases also implicitly addressed the separation of powers
issue raised by the dissent in Abbeville. While the Texas Supreme Court
essentially found the Texas legislature should fund education so that each
district can provide at least a minimum educational opportunity, the Texas
court left the details of the funding scheme to the legislature.2" ' This holding
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the court merely
interpreted the Texas Constitution and did not usurp the legislative function by
implementing a specific funding scheme.
5. Kentucky

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 732.
Thro, supranote 85, at 244 n.133.
Id. at 246-47.
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396.
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Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "[tihe general
assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of
common schools throughout the State." '' In Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc.,2 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the General
Assembly had violated its constitutional duty as expressed in section 183.2"3
The court stated that the Kentucky legislature was the sole government
body in charge of the public school system." 4 It instructed the General
Assembly to provide for a new system of funding public education that "will
guarantee to all children the opportunity for an adequate education, through a
' The Kentucky Supreme Court further noted it was not trying
state system."215
to usurp legislative authority by calling for any specific bill.2" 6 The court was,
instead, detailing what the constitutional mandate of an efficient school system
entails.217
In developing a definition of an efficient system of public schools, the
supreme court analyzed Kentucky's constitutional debates, Kentucky's legal
precedents, persuasive authority from other states, and expert opinions. 218 The
court concluded that an efficient education provides all students with the
following abilities:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

sufficient oral and written communication skills to
enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization;
sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices;
sufficient understanding of governmental processes
to enable the student to understand the issues that
affect his or her community, state, and nation;
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or
her mental and physical wellness;
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical
heritage;
sufficient training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields so as
to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; and

Ky. CONST. § 183 (emphasis added).
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
Id. at 189.
Id. at 211.
Id. at212.
Id.
Id.
Seeid. at205-11.
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(vii)

sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts in surrounding states, in
academics or in the job market.219

The Kentucky Supreme Court also addressed whether its judgment, which
partially affirmed the trial court, violated the separation of powers doctrine."
The court stated its duties were to examine the constitutionality and meaning
of legislative enactments.' The court further noted it had simply stated the
standards implicit in section 183, and the legislature could comply in any
m
manner it thought would best address the inadequacies ofthe present system.2
The court found itself in no danger of usurping the legislature's power.'
The Kentucky Supreme Court's holding in Rose is based upon its finding
that the Kentucky public schools did not meet minimum standards of
adequacy.2 24 In so holding, the Kentucky judiciary modified the constraints of
the separation of powers doctrine and took an activist role in determining the
constitutional requirements of an efficient education.225 Rose thus exhibits the
fact that courts may take a more assertive role in the area of education finance
and move away from the traditional position of granting the legislature total
discretion.2
Rose is part of the third wave of education finance reform litigation. The
Kentucky Supreme Court did not in any way analyze the case based on the
equality guarantees in the Kentucky Constitution.2 7Instead, the court analyzed
the case based solely on the state constitution's education clause, which is the
defining characteristic of third wave cases.22' The Kentucky Constitution's
requirement of an efficient education sets forth aminimum qualitative standard.
Thus, this clause seems to fall within the Category II education clauses which
are capable of judicial interpretation. Implicitly addressing Thro's fivequestion analysis for third wave cases, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that
a new system of funding education was needed to meet the constitutional
mandate.
Following the reasoning in Rose, it seems clear that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's ruling in Abbeville did not violate the separation of powers

219. Id. at212.
220. Id. at 214.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Stark, supra note 198, at 653.
225. See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative
Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ONLEGIS. 341,344 (1991).
226. Id. at 346.
227. Thro, supra note 85, at 236.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 244.
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doctrine. The Rose court found, as long as the court did not state the type of
legislation needed to fulfill the constitutional requirement, the legislature can
use its discretion to determine what funding scheme would best meet the needs
of the present educational system. Allowing the legislature to determine the
best way to achieve the constitutional mandate ensures that the separation of
powers doctrine is preserved.
B. Analysis ofthe South CarolinaConstitution'sEducation Clause
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision inAbbeville County School
District v. State"0 seems to fall within the third wave of education finance
reform. Because the South Carolina Supreme Court quickly disposed of the
other claims based on the federal and state constitutions, Abbeville's definition
of the constitution's education mandate was based on the South Carolina
Constitution's education clause alone. Therefore, the court's holding
exemplified the defining characteristic of the third wave of education finance
reform litigation: reliance solely on the state constitution's education clause.
Because the Abbeville case was decided during this third wave, it is
important to analyze it using Thro's five-question analysis for third wave cases.
First, since the plaintiffs contended the funding system resulted in an
inadequate education, Abbeville is definitely an adequacy case. As an adequacy
case, the Abbeville court had to determine in which category South Carolina's
education clause belonged. South Carolina's education clause only requires the
legislature to create a system offree public schools; therefore, South Carolina's
education clause seems to fall within Category I education clauses.2 1 If Thro's
analysis is correct, this type of clause alone provides no basis for mandating
education finance reform. By simply creating any public school system, the
South Carolina legislature had fulfilled its constitutional duty. Thus, the South
Carolina Supreme Court, under Thro's analysis, seemingly had no basis for
defining the constitutional mandate under the education clause alone.
Nevertheless, the court did define the constitutional mandate and then
remanded the case to determine if the state's present system of education
funding met this standard. Thus, the fourth and fifth questions were left to be
resolved on remand.
However, Thro's "textual taxonomy" of education clauses may not be
entirely sound. If Thro is correct, the directive of the South Carolina
Constitution's education clause that the legislature maintain and support a free
public school system could be met by hiring one teacher and by building one
school. If Thro is incorrect, however, the very existence of the education clause
may trigger an implicit adequacy standard for which the legislature must be
responsible. This latter view of the South Carolina Constitution's education

230. 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999).
231. Thro, supranote 85, at 243 n.131.
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clause seems more probable. That the state constitution would contain a clause
that is merely precatory is unlikely.
The South Carolina Supreme Court is correct in its reading of an adequacy
standard into the state constitution's education clause. The court seemed to
follow legitimate precedent for its Abbeville decision, drawing from the lessons
of Connecticut, New Jersey, West Virginia, Texas, and Kentucky, among
others, in developing its definition of a minimally adequate education. Finally,
the Abbeville decision did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The
South Carolina Supreme Court left the details of the funding scheme to the
state legislature, and its opinion did not give the state legislature any time limit
in which it had to enact this funding scheme.f 2 Most importantly, the court
fulfilled the intent of the state constitution's framers as expressed in the
constitutional conventions and by the West Committee.
IV. CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Abbeville may have
opened the door to education finance reform in South Carolina, depending
upon the lower court's decision on remand. The lower court may decide that
the current systemmeets the requirements ofa "minimally adequate education"
as defined in Abbeville, and, thus, no need for public school financing reform
exists. If the court decides in the alternative, however, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's initial decision in Abbeville may have monumental effects.
The Abbeville decision may, in fact, be the impetus for further improvements
in South Carolina public schools.
Jennifer L. Fogle

232. The legislature should beware of inaction which could prompt increasing judicial
activism. See supranote 148 and accompanying text.
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